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Fiscal federalism in Brazil:
an overview
José Serra and José Roberto R. Afonso
A lthough the states and municipalities that comprise the 
Brazilian Federation have considerable autonomy in raising their own 
tax income and spending public funds, this is not the outcome of a 
planned decentralization process. The improvement in fiscal indicators 
at the subnational-government level since the promulgation of the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act has made a major contribution to the success 
of the country’s macroeconomic stabilization policy. Nonetheless, the 
Federation is seen as a major stumbling block for reform of the tax 
system. As a contribution to the debate on federative balance in the 
division of fiscal responsibilities, this paper makes a diagnostic study of 
the federative framework and recent institutional changes, and proposes 
a new federative agenda.
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The fact that the Brazilian Federation is characterized 
by pronounced f iscal decentralization, has led to 
accusations that it hinders economic stabilization. Yet 
stabilization was finally achieved under the Real Plan, 
implemented in June 1994, without the federative 
structure being significantly altered.
The scant commitment shown by Brazil’s 
subnational governments1 towards formulating and 
implementing healthy macroeconomic practices (in 
which respect it differs little from other federations) 
has also also been seen as obstructing the consolidation 
of stability. Nonetheless, starting in the late 1990s 
Brazil embarked upon a profound reform of its public 
f inances, in a process that culminated in a f iscal 
responsibility law that surpassed all other federations in 
the degree of transparency and austerity it demands of 
federated members. The situation has been reversed to 
such an extent that better primary and nominal results 
achieved by the states and municipalities (along with 
State-owned enterprises) have recently compensated 
for a deterioration of those indicators at the central 
(federal) government level.
In recent years, the Federation has ceased to act 
as a disrupting factor in the “economic order”, and 
now actually contributes to the success of short-term 
macroeconomic policy (at least with regard to the 
management of surplus and debt targets). A structural 
issue remains unresolved, however, along with attendant 
difficulties and distortions: the Federation is still 
viewed by many as the chief obstacle to reforming the 
economy, as if the federative division of tax revenues 
had been frozen since implementation of the system 
defined by the 1988 Constitution. This idea is false, 
however, for financing and public expenditure trends 
have changed significantly in recent years.
 This article, which draws on data available up to September 2006, 
is based on a paper presented at the International Conference on 
Federalism at the Forum on Federations (Mont-Tremblant, Canada, 
October 1999). The opinions expressed herein are the exclusive 
reponsibility of the authors and not of the institutions to which they 
are affiliated. The economists Rafael Barroso, Beatriz Meirelles 
and Kleber Castro helped to prepare the analysis and update the 
statistical database.
1 In this paper, the term “subnational governments” will be used to 
refer to government authorities both at the state level, including the 
Federal District, and at the municipal level.
2 In 2005, GDP was US$ 796 billion, at current prices converted 
using the current exchange rate, according to the Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD).
3 According to the World Bank ranking of countries for 2002, using 
per capita GDP calculated on a purchasing-power-parity basis.






Brazil is the world’s tenth largest economy in terms 
of gross domestic product (GDP),2 has the fifth largest 
population (184.2 million inhabitants) and is fifth 
also in terms of land area. Following a long period 
of stagnation in the nineteenth century, its economy 
grew faster than any other country in the world 
between 1870s and 1970s, while also undergoing far-
reaching structural change. The pace of growth was 
particularly rapid after World War II, but it has slowed 
dramatically over the last 26 years. As a result, Brazil’s 
per capita income (US$ 7,450) is still 86th in the world 
ranking,3 it ranks 63rd in the Human Development 
Index (0.792),4 and its income distribution is among 
the most unequal on the planet (a Gini coefficient of 
0.544 in 2005).
Accustomed to vigorous output and employment 
growth and rapid structural changes, and wishing to bring 
about a substantial improvement in social conditions 
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among the poorest segments of the population, Brazil, 
at the start of this new century, has been impatiently 
striving to regain the momentum of growth without 
compromising the price stability achieved at such cost 
12 years ago.
For three fifths of the recent period of economic 
semi-stagnation (1980-2006), the country endured an 
acute process of hyperinflation, which was overcome 
only in the mid-1990s after at least eight unsuccessful 
attempts. Since then, reforms have been introduced to 
regain development with stability, and the State’s role 
in economic life has been redefined. The economy 
has become more open to international trade and 
financial flows, and social and industrial policies have 
been retargeted —along with the fiscal and federative 
system, the topic of this article.
Improving fiscal federalism in Brazil is essential, 
both to maintain economic stability and to resume 
sustainable development, since the formulation and 
implementation of more appropriate economic policies 
depend, among other things, on the structure and 
harmonization of internal and external taxation.5
2. Historical setting
In a country without major cultural conflicts arising 
from linguistic, religious or even ethnic identities, the 
Brazilian Federation was created in 1891 as a response 
to regional differences and administrative needs 
spanning a continent-sized land area. This federation 
was not the outcome of any “bottom-up” coalition, 
but was created by a “top-down” decision to divide 
a unitary state. In terms of the tax system, the move 
to federation mainly benefited the more developed 
provinces of the south and southeast, especially São 
Paulo where the new export sector was concentrated. It 
is no coincidence that that state headed the republican 
movement and led the republic in its early days. One 
of the main objectives was to obtain greater freedom 
of movement to levy local taxes on foreign trade.6 
In return, the less developed regions were offered 
more-than-proportional representation in the National 
Congress.
Since its creation, the Brazilian federative system 
has experienced clearly defined cycles of central-
government contraction and expansion.7 Between 
1891 and 1930, under the “Old Republic” and at 
the height of the primary-economy/coffee-exporting 
boom, the federal government was relatively weak, 
and its relative share of national public expenditure 
shrank from about three quarters to a half. At the same 
time, the proportion of total state government income 
generated by São Paulo expanded from just over 10% 
to nearly 40%.
This was followed by a cycle of centralization 
between 1930 and 1946, which began with the revolution 
of 1930 (Revolução de 30). This phase accompanied 
the global economic depression and culminated with 
the Getulio Vargas dictatorship (the “New State”). 
Centralization of power in the hands of the federal 
government made it possible to complete the unification 
of the domestic market and strengthen the foundations of 
industrialization. In that period, the federal authorities’ 
share in the inter-governmental division of public 
expenditure increased from 50% to 55%.
At the end of the World War II, the redemocratization 
of the country and new democratic Constitution of 1946 
inaugurated a new decentralization phase; and central 
government once again absorbed about 50% of total 
national public expenditure in the following decade.
The advent of the military regime in 1964 ushered 
in a two-decade phase of resource centralization (table 
1), which was useful both for fiscal reform —in the 
first half of the period, with the concentration of 
income and control of expenditure in the hands of 
central government— and for the political and social 
control that the regime needed. In 1983, at the height 
of centralization, the federal government share in 
disposable tax revenue peaked at almost 70%, broadly 
matching its share in the federative division of national 
public expenditure.
The weakening of the military regime combined 
with the winds of political openness to moderate 
central power in the f irst half of the 1980s, and 
this trend was reaffirmed in the second half of that 
decade with redemocratization and the drafting of a 
5 See Oates (1999) for an up-to-date overview of fiscal federalism, 
covering both theoretical principles and international experiences.
6 A feature of the Brazilian tax system that contrasts with that of the 
United States has been highlighted by Professor Alcides Jorge Costa: 
ever since the colonial period, the intermediate level of government 
in Brazil has always managed to uphold its own right to tax exports, 
including those of industrial products. In contrast, property taxation 
has always been derisory, especially in rural areas, which was usually 
assigned to the federal jurisdiction. For example, in 2005, the states 
raised about R$ 8.8 billion from vehicle property tax – 36 times 
more than the R$ 240 million that central government collected 
from rural land tax.
7 The statistics on the division of revenue or expenditure between the 
different spheres of government discussed in the following paragraphs 
are based mainly on Goldsmith (1986).
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new Constitution (1987-1988). When the National 
Constituent Assembly began to operate, disposable tax 
income was no longer so highly concentrated in central 
government hands: the federal share had been reduced 
to about 60%,8 contrary to popular belief prevailing 
both in Congress and among government authorities 
(including at the federal level) and the press.
Moreover, against a backdrop of prolonged 
hyperinflation and failed stabilization programmes, the 
weakness of the previous tax system became clearly 
visible, as the national tax burden shrank from about 
25% of GDP in the early 1970s to 22% in 1988.
Since the 1970s, the banners of fiscal decentralization 
and a weakening of central power have held a prominent 
place in the ideology and process of the country’s 
re-democratization. The movement achieved major 
success in the final phase of the authoritarian regime 
in the first half of the 1980s. In the second half, the 
new Constitution (1988) gave another vigorous boost 
to transfers. The share of the main federal taxes, i.e. 
Income Tax (IR) and the Industrial Products Tax (IPI), 
which was paid into the State and Municipal Revenue 
Sharing Funds (FPE and FPM) grew from 18% to 44% 
between 1980 and 1990. If all constitutionally mandated 
transfers are included, the portion transferred amounts 
to 47% of IR and 57% of IPI. The comparative figure 
in 1980 was just 20%.9
Following promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, 
subnational government tax capacity was also 
strengthened and consolidated (figure 1). In the case 
of the states, for example, the tax base of state-level 
ICMS was extended, with the new tax absorbing five 
old federal taxes. Rates were also made more flexible, 
as was the corresponding administration, which was 
entirely delegated to the states themselves. Revenue 
transfers from this tax to the municipalities were also 
increased by 25%. Revenue raised by the municipalities 
themselves also grew, and they more than doubled their 
share of the total tax revenue collected in the country: 
from 2.7% of the overall tax burden in 1989 to 5.6% 
in 2005 (figure 2).
TABLE 1
Brazil: Tax burden and its federative division, 1960-2005
(Percentages)
 Year Tax burden Direct collectiona  Disposable tax revenueb
  (Percentage Central States Municipalities Total Central  States Municipalities Total
 of GDP) government    government
 1960 17.41 64.0 31.3 4.7 100.0 59.5 34.1 6.4 100.0
 1965 18.99 63.6 30.8 5.6 100.0 54.8 35.1 10.1 100.0
 1983 26.97 76.6 20.6 2.8 100.0 69.8 21.3 8.9 100.0
 1988 22.43 71.7 25.6 2.7 100.0 60.1 26.6 13.3 100.0
 1991 25.24 63.4 31.2 5.4 100.0 54.7 29.6 15.7 100.0
 2005 38.94 68.4 26.0 5.6 100.0 57.6 25.2 17.2 100.0
Source: Afonso and Meirelles (2006).
a Direct collection = Revenue collected directly by each sphere of government from its own tax jurisdictions in each state or region.
b Disposable tax revenue = Direct collection (own tax jurisdictions) plus or minus constitutionally mandated revenue transfers, including: 
(i) those granted by the central government, which include cash transfers from the State Revenue Sharing Fund (FPE), the Municipal 
Revenue Sharing Fund (FPM), the Export Compensation Fund (FPEx), the revenue-insurance generated by the Sales Tax on Merchandise 
and Services (ICMS), and complementation of the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and Professional 
Development of Teachers (FUNDEF); and (ii) transfers granted by the the states —25% of ICMS/FPEx and 50% of the Motor Vehicle 
Ownership Tax (IPVA), in addition to redistribution from FUNDEF. The municipalities’ disposable income consists exclusively of federal 
and state transfers.
8 See Serra and Afonso (1991).
9 Of this, 3% is channelled to regional banks in the north (Banco 
da Amazônia, BASA), northeast (BNB) and centre-west regions. In 
the latter case, as there is no regional bank, the account is managed 
as a sinking fund by Banco do Brasil, for regional loans; 10% of 
IPI revenue is paid into a state fund to compensate for the fact that 
ICMS is not levied on exported manufactured products.
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This phenomenon was accompanied by an 
increase in the national tax burden, which was far more 
pronounced in the more developed regions: rising in 
2005 to 36.7% of GDP nationally;10 48.7% and 42.2% in 
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, respectively; and 22.7% 
and 24% in the north and northeast (table 2).
FIGURE 2
Brazil: Federative division of disposable tax revenue, 1960-2005
(Percentages)
FIGURE 1
Brazil: Federative division of direct tax revenue, 1960-2005
(Percentages)
In vertical terms, which is the main focus of fiscal 
federalism, nearly all relative gains have benefited 
the municipal sector, with the states’ position altering 
little, especially in terms of disposable tax revenue 
(own tax revenue plus or minus constitutionally 
mandated transfers). In horizontal terms, the additional 
resources were mostly destined for state and municipal 
governments in the less developed regions, thereby 
reversing the heavy concentration of revenue and 
GDP pertaining to the more developed regions, in the 
distribution of disposable tax income and expenditure. 
Both trends will be shown in the next section.
10 Statistics on the regionalization of tax revenues show a national 
consolidation that is slightly less than the amount of revenue indicated 
by the national accounts methodology, which includes federal revenue 
items for which there is no information by state of origin.
Source: Afonso and Meirelles (2006).
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TABLE 2
Brazil: Regional distribution of own tax revenue, 2005
 Regions and states Total tax revenue Direct tax revenuea (R$ million)
 Percentage Per capita  Total  Federal  State  Municipalc
 of GDPb (real per 
  inhabitant)
 A  B C D E F
Brazil 36.7  3 857   710 283 100.0   478 499 100.0   195 496 100.0   36 288 100.0 
More developed regions 37.2 5 047.8 532 252.5 74.9 364 985.8 76.3 136 951.7 70.1 30 315.0 83.5
 Southeast  41.2 5 613.4 440 486.4 62.0 310 118.2 64.8 105 593.6 54.0 24 774.6 68.3
 Minas Gerais 28.2 2 638.4 50 754.7 7.1 27 179.4 5.7 20 601.5 10.5 2 973.8 8.2
 Espírito Santo 40.2 4 252.4 14 492.1 2.0 8 027.5 1.7 5 886.5 3.0 578.2 1.6
 Rio de Janeiro 48.7 7 504.1 115 435.0 16.3 91 888.9 19.2 18 224.4 9.3 5 321.7 14.7
 São Paulo 42.2 6 424.1 259 804.6 36.6 183 022.5 38.2 60 881.2 31.1 15 900.9 43.8
 South  25.5 3 402.3 91 766.2 12.9 54 867.6 11.5 31 358.1 16.0 5 540.5 15.3
 Paraná 25.5 3 066.9 31 469.6 4.4 19 415.1 4.1 10 087.5 5.2 1 967.0 5.4
 Santa Catarina 26.2 3 455.7 20 271.4 2.9 11 758.3 2.5 7 196.4 3.7 1 316.7 3.6
 Rio Grande do Sul 25.1 3 690.7 40 025.2 5.6 23 694.1 5.0 14 074.3 7.2 2 256.8 6.2
Less developed regions 35.2 2 274.3 179 037.1 25.2 113 512.9 23.7 58 544.5 29.9 6 979.6 19.2
 North  22.7 1 489.4 21 886.7 3.1 10 250.6 2.1 10 461.6 5.4 1 174.5 3.2
 Acre 23.3 1 177.0 787.4 0.1 291.9 0.1 459.0 0.2 36.5 0.1
 Amazonas 26.4 2 858.5 9 238.8 1.3 5 152.4 1.1 3 677.3 1.9 409.1 1.1
 Pará 18.6 971.1 6 768.3 1.0 2 963.0 0.6 3 327.4 1.7 477.9 1.3
 Rondônia 22.3 1 539.0 2 360.9 0.3 742.4 0.2 1 513.4 0.8 105.1 0.3
 Roraima 27.0 1 442.5 564.0 0.1 252.4 0.1 274.1 0.1 37.5 0.1
 Amapá 17.4 1 121.5 666.2 0.1 289.6 0.1 341.1 0.2 35.5 0.1
 Tocantins 28.8 1 150.3 1 501.1 0.2 558.8 0.1 869.4 0.4 73.0 0.2
 Northeast  24.0 1 258.3 64 182.6 9.0 30 333.2 6.3 29 774.1 15.2 4 075.3 11.2
 Maranhãó 24.9 709.5 4 330.1 0.6 2 073.9 0.4 1 968.8 1.0 287.4 0.8
 Piauí 23.1 702.9 2 105.9 0.3 844.7 0.2 1 115.7 0.6 145.5 0.4
 Ceará 26.8 1 169.0 9 469.1 1.3 4 592.2 1.0 4 118.8 2.1 758.1 2.1
 Rio Grande do Norte 23.2 1 315.8 3 951.4 0.6 1 571.0 0.3 2 086.7 1.1 293.8 0.8
 Paraíba 20.7 982.2 3 530.9 0.5 1 488.4 0.3 1 828.9 0.9 213.6 0.6
 Pernambuco 26.2 1 641.2 13 807.4 1.9 6 392.2 1.3 6 478.1 3.3 937.1 2.6
 Alagoas 20.8 887.7 2 676.3 0.4 1 080.4 0.2 1 366.3 0.7 229.6 0.6
 Sergipe 25.5 1 890.8 3 719.3 0.5 1 213.0 0.3 1 479.9 0.8 1 026.4 2.8
 Bahia 22.6 1 490.6 20 592.3 2.9 11 077.4 2.3 9 331.0 4.8 183.9 0.5
 Centre-west  64.3 7 140.9 92 967.7 13.1 72 929.2 15.2 18 308.8 9.4 1 729.8 4.8
 Federal District  150.8 30 379.5 70 875.3 10.0 64 285.3 13.4 5 689.4 2.9 900.6 2.5
 Goiás 22.8 1 862.2 10 463.7 1.5 4 512.6 0.9 5 602.6 2.9 348.6 1.0
 Mato Grosso 24.0 2 411.8 6 760.1 1.0 2 312.2 0.5 3 967.3 2.0 480.6 1.3
 Mato Grosso do Sul 20.6 2 150.4 4 868.5 0.7 1 819.0 0.4 3 049.5 1.6    
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Treasury (STN, various years), the Ministry of Welfare and Social Assistance, 
the Federal Economic Fund, the National Economic Policy Council, and the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE).
a  Direct collection = Revenue collected directly by each sphere of government from its own tax jurisdictions in each state or region.
 - Central government revenue includes taxes (on foreign trade, capital and income, production); fees; social, economic and welfare 
contributions; and contributions to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (FGTS). The information per state is distorted for some taxes, 
because revenue collection is not the responsibility of an establishment or branch; and figures for the Federal District consolidates 
revenues obtained directly by the Federal Government or those of national scope.
 - State revenue collection includes the state-level ICMS, IPVA, the Inheritance and Gift Tax (ITCD), fees and other items. Municipal revenue 
includes the Urban Real Estate Tax (IPTU), the Tax on Services (ISS), the Tax on Property Transfer between Living Persons (ITBI), fees 
and contributions for improvements.
 - Municipal tax revenue pertaining to the Federal District corresponds to revenue obtained by the district government from IPTU, ISS, 
and ITBI.
b State-level GDP at current prices estimated on the basis of 2003 shares.
c Municipal revenue was reported by the Treasury on the basis of a 4,164-city sample, encompassing about 87% of the Brazilian 
population.
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An updated diagnosis of the situation of the Brazilian 
Federation11 can be summarized in the following five 
points.
1. A system that is still evolving
The federative system in Brazil, a country whose 
economic frontier is still expanding, is still not physically 
complete, irrespective of the conflicts and conceptual 
issues that remain. Evidence for this is the fact that 
two new states were created in the 1970s (Mato Grosso 
do Sul and Rondônia), and another three following 
the National Constituent Assembly (Amapá, Roraima 
and Tocantins). All five of these new states are in less 
developed regions in the centre-north of the country. 
The National Constituent Assembly also put the Federal 
District in the same category as other states, by giving it 
full representation in the National Congress and its own 
legislative assembly, police and judicial system.
Moreover, the decentralising impetus of the 1988 
Constitution gave the municipalities constitutional 
status as quasi-members of the Brazilian Federation. 
Initially, this encouraged the creation of new 
municipalities, as the total number rose from just over 
4,000 to 5,564 in 2005.12 In 1996, it was necessary to 
make a constitutional amendment to slow down this 
proliferation, by requiring that new municipalities be 
approved by popular plebiscite encompassing both 
territories —i.e. the territory being considered for 
emancipation and also the territory of origin.13
2. Vertical decentralization
In relation to the tax burden, the states and municipalities 
directly collected 31.6% of total taxes levied in Brazil in 
2005. Once the constitutionally mandated distribution of 
revenues had been accomplished, subnational governments 
controlled 42.4% of national tax revenue, including social 
and pension fund contributions (table 1).
On the expenditure side, and contrary to popular 
belief about the Brazilian public sector, the states 
and municipalities exercise clear predominance in the 
government actions and services that most serve the 
population, apart from expenses in respect of financial 
charges and social benefits. According to the national 
accounts (the most recent official figures are for 2003), 
state and municipal governments accounted for 71% 
of the payroll of active civil servants in the country, 
in addition to 75% of other financing expenses and 
85% of fixed investments (table 3 and figure 3).14 
Central government predominates only in the case 
of personal transfers, mainly consisting of pension 
benefits, and interest payments on the public debt, in 
which it accounted for about 85% of the consolidated 
government expenditure at all levels.
The trend of primary government expenditure in 
the period since the National Constituent Assembly 
dispels any doubts regarding decentralization, since 
it matches the redistribution of tax revenues even 
though the process has unfolded without proper 
planning or coordination. Whereas in 1988, central 
government absorbed 44% of all government demand 
for goods and services (including labour), by 2003 
this proportion had fallen to 27% (table 3). In recent 
years, the distribution of overall expenditure reflects 
the reaction of central government to the rapid growth 
of expenditures on income transfers, particularly social 
benefits (pensions and social assistance), and interest 
on the public debt.
III
Analysis of the federative framework
11 See Affonso (1994) for a more detailed analysis of f iscal 
decentralization in Brazil.
12 A study made by the Industrial Development Studies Institute 
(IEDI, 2006) estimates the “political cost” of the municipalities (i.e. 
the minimum amount of expenditure required to operate the federated 
municipal entity) at around R$ 10 billion or 0.6% of GDP.
13 Constitutional Amendment No. 15, of December 1996, succeeded 
in halting the creation of new municipalities, despite being generic 
and depending on the passing of a complementary law. From 
1997 to 2005, only 57 were created, and these are covered by the 
previous legislation, since all of their processes had begun before 
the constitutional amendment was passed.
14 This situation has been accentuated by a drastic downsizing of 
the State enterprise sector (not counted in the calculations made in 
this paper). This resulted from the rapid privatization process of the 
1990s, particularly in the federal domain (e.g. telecommunications, 
mining, iron and steel, petrochemicals, electric power, rail transport 
and the road network).
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TABLE 3
Brazil: Federative division of public expenditure in the national accounts,
1988, 2000 and 2003
  Main non-financial expenses
 Government  Period Intermediate  Remuneration of  Gross fixed  Total expenditure
 level  consumptiona employees (active)b capital formation
  Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
  of GDP of total of GDP of total of GDP of total of GDP of total
 Federalc 1988 2.6 55.3 3.2 40.5 1.1 34.4 6.9 43.7
  2000 2.0 32.0 3.0 32.7 0.5 26.6 5.5 31.8
  2003 1.7 25.4 2.9 29.3 0.3 15.5 4.9 26.6
 State  1988 1.2 25.5 3.3 41.8 1.2 37.5 5.7 36.1
  2000 1.9 31.4 3.9 41.7 0.6 32.8 6.4 37.1
  2003 2.3 33.3 4.1 41.4 0.7 39.2 7.1 38.2
 Municipal 1988 0.9 19.1 1.4 17.7 0.9 28.1 3.2 20.3
   2000 2.2 36.6 2.4 25.6 0.8 40.6 5.4 31.1
  2003 2.8 41.3 2.9 29.2 0.8 45.3 6.5 35.1
 Consolidated 1988 4.7 100.0 7.9 100.0 3.2 100.0 15.8 100.0
 general 2000 6.1 100.0 9.3 100.0 1.9 100.0 17.3 100.0
 government 2003 6.8 100.0 10.0 100.0 1.7 100.0 18.5 100.0
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of IBGE (2003). This is the latest year for which the final volume of national accounts is 
available.
a Intermediate consumption includes direct purchases of goods and services for current operations.
b A deduction was made for what the IBGE refers to as “imputed social contributions”, corresponding to the financing of civil servant 
pension contributions.
c Includes social security - general regime, managed by the National Social Security Institute (INSS) and the Unemployment Insurance 
Fund (FGTS).
FIGURE 3
Brazil: Federative division of primary public expenditure, 2003
Source: Prepared by the authors, using data from the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE).
a Governments include decentralized administrations, but not productive State enterprises. Central government includes social security.
b Intermediate consumption includes other direct purchases of goods and services.
c Excluding what the IBGE refers to as “imputed social contributions” corresponding to the f inancing of civil servant pension 
contributions.
Central government States Municipalities
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TABLE 4
Brazil: Regional distribution of subnational disposable tax income,a 2005
 Regions and states States Municipalities Subnational = states + municipalities
 Disposable income Disposable income Disposable income
    Transfer.    Federal    Federal
   Millions Federal/   Millions transfers/   Millions transfers/
 % of Real per of real and disposable % of Real per of real and disposable % of Real per of real and disposable
 GDPb  capita % of totalc income GDPb capita % totalc income  GDPb  capita % totalc revenue
  
 A B C D E F G H I J K L
Brazil 7.7 808.4 114.780 22.8 4.3 456.1 62.737 40.0 12.0 1 264.6 177.517 29.0
      100.0       100.0       100.0  
Brazil except São Paulo 8.1  606.8 72.3 29.8 4.8 441.7 75.6 46.3 13.0 1 191.1  73.5 35.9
More developed regions 6.5 875.0 62.0 9.8 3.6 486.6 61.1 29.8 10.0 1 361.5 61.6 17.0
 Southeast  6.5 884.8 46.6 7.9 3.5 476.3 44.5 26.3 10.0 1 361.0 45.9 14.3
 Minas Gerais 7.7 723.6 9.3 15.3 4.8 453.2 10.4 43.0 12.6 1 176.8 9.7 25.9
 Espírito Santo 11.1 1 170.7 2.7 17.0 6.5 687.2 2.8 37.8 17.5 1 857.8 2.7 24.7
 Río de Janeiro 4.4 672.1 6.9 7.8 2.4 376.5 6.9 17.7 6.8 1 048.7 6.9 11.4
 São Paulo 6.7 1018.3 27.7 4.6 3.3 507.4 24.4 20.3 10.0 1 525.7 26.5 9.8
 South  6.3 846.4 15.3 15.7 3.9 516.5 16.6 76.7 10.2  1 363.0 15.8 24.6
 Paraná 6.4 774.1 5.3 18.3 4.1 491.4 6.0 42.5 10.5 1 265.6 5.6 27.7
 Santa Catarina 6.5 862.6 3.4 14.6 4.0 530.6 3.7 38.6 10.6 1 393.2 3.5 23.7
 Rio Grande del Sul 6.2 906.1 6.6 14.2 3.6 532.7 6.9 36.7 9.8 1 438.7 6.7 22.5
Less developed regions 11.1 719.2 38.0 44.0 6.4 415.4 38.9 55.9 17.6 1 134.7 38.4 48.3
 North  14.1 927.8 9.2 55.4 6.3 411.5 7.2 54.9 20.4 1 339.3 8.5 55.3
 Acre 36.6 1847.9 0.8 80.0 9.1 460.4 0.4 69.8 45.7 2 308.3 0.7 77.9
 Amazonas 8.6 932.0 2.0 29.1 4.1 442.4 1.7 34.2 12.7 1 374.4 1.9 30.8
 Pará 10.5 549.5 2.6 48.9 6.8 353.0 2.9 59.6 17.3 902.5 2.7 53.1
 Rondônia 16.2 1,117.8 1.2 47.3 6.7 462.6 0.8 46.5 22.9 1 580.4 1.0 47.1
 Roraima 44.8 2,395.1 0.6 79.7 10.3 550.9 0.3 70.2 55.2 2 945.9 0.5 77.9
 Amapá 30.0 1,935.7 0.8 87.7 4.9 315.7 0.2 73.8 34.8 2 251.4 0.6 85.7
 Tocantins 33.6 1345.2 1.2 71.4 14.1 563.4 0.9 72.1 47.7 1 908.7 1.1 71.6
 Northeast  11.6 606.5 20.8 48.4 7.6 399.7 24.3 62.1 19.2 1 006.2 22.0 53.8
 Maranhão 17.6 502.2 2.1 67.1 12.8 364.4 2.6 76.4 30.4  866.6  2.3 71.0
 Piauí 20.0 607.8 1.2 65.4 13.5 411.8 1.5 74.3 33.5 1 019.6 1.3 69.0
 Ceará 11.8 516.2 2.8 48.4 8.6 374.1 3.6 62.8 20.4 890.4 3.1 54.4
 Rio Grande do Norte 13.9 786.5 1.6 51.0 8.1 460.7 1.6 61.7 22.0 1 247.2 1.6 55.0
 Paraíba 13.6 647.9 1.6 59.1 9.0 425.6 1.8 71.3 22.6 1 073.6 1.7 63.9
 Pernambuco 9.7 608.7 3.4 38.9 5.9 370.6 3.7 54.4 15.7 979.3 3.5 44.8
 Alagoas 15.1 644.6 1.3 59.9 9.6 411.4 1.5 69.7 24.8 1 056.0 1.4 63.7
 Sergipe 12.9 958.3 1.3 61.8 6.0 442.5 1.0 62.8 18.9 1 400.8 1.2 62.1
 Bahia 9.0 595.6 5.5 33.9 6.3 416.6 6.9 53.8 15.4  1012.2 6.0 42.1
 Centre-west  8.3 925.5 8.1 19.7 4.3 481.6 7.5 36.5 12.7 1,407.1 7.9 25.5
 Federal District  5.5 1,117.6 1.8 9.4 1.9 385.3 1.1 6.6 7.5 1 502.9 1.5 8.7
 Goiás 9.8 800.5 3.0 20.6 4.4 359.1 2.4 56.2 14.2 1 159.6 2.8 31.6
 Mato Grosso 9.6 964.6 1.8 28.0 6.7 677.3 2.3 32.5 16.3 1 641.9 2.0 29.9
 Mato Grosso do Sul 9.5 989.3 1.5 19.8 6.2 642.4 1.7 33.0 15.6 1 631.7 1.6 25.0
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Treasury (STN, various years), the Ministry of Welfare and Social Assistance, 
the Federal Economic Fund, the National Economic Policy Council, and the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE).
a Disposable tax revenue = Direct collection (own tax jurisdictions) plus or minus constitutionally mandated tax transfers, including (i) 
those granted by the central government, which include cash transfers from FPE, FPM, FPEx, the revenue-insurance generated by ICMS, 
and complementation of FUNDEF; and (ii) transfers granted by the the states – 25% of ICMS/FPEx and 50% of IPVA, in addition to 
redistribution from FUNDEF. The municipalities’ disposable income consists exclusively of federal and state transfers.
b State GDP at current prices estimated on the basis of 2003 shares.
c For Brazil, first line, columns C, G and K, the amount is expressed in millions of real at current prices.
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TABLE 5
Brazil: Regional distribution of population, income and political representation, 2005
 Regions and states Population Gross domestic product  GDP  Conditions  Distribution of seats
   (GDP)a per capita of life
 Millions of Percentages R$ million Percentages R$/ Index = Chamber Senate  Congress
 inhabitants    Inhabitant 100 of Deputies
Brazil 184.2  1 937 598  10 521 0.766 513 81 594 
        % % %
More developed regions 105.4 57.3 1 429 341 73.8 13 556 0.799 49.9 25.9 46.6
 Southeast 78.5 42.6 1 069 192 55.2 13 625 0.791 34.9 14.8 32.2
 Minas Gerais 19.2 10.4 179 972 9.3 9 356 0.773 10.3 3.7 9.4
 Espírito Santo 3.4 1.9 36 083 1.9 10 588 0.765 1.9 3.7 2.2
 Rio de Janeiro 15.4 8.4 237 046 12.2 15 410 0.807 9.0 3.7 8.2
 São Paulo 40.4 22.0 616 091 31.8 15 234 0.820 13.6 3.7 12.3
 South 27.0 14.6 360 149 18.6 13 353 0.808 15.0 11.1 14.5
 Paraná 10.3 5.6 123 264 6.4 12 013 0.787 5.8 3.7 5.6
 Santa Catarina 5.9 3.2 77 462 4.0 13 205 0.822 3.1 3.7 3.2
 Rio Grande do Sul 10.8 5.9 159 422 8.2 14 700 0.814 6.0 3.7 5.7
Less developed regions 78.7 42.7 508 257 26.2 6 456 0.713 50.1 74.1 53.4
 North 14.7 8.0 96 415 5.0 6 561 0.725 12.7 25.9 14.5
 Acre 0.7 0.4 3 382 0.2 5 055 0.697 1.6 3.7 1.9
 Amazonas 3.2 1.8 34 941 1.8 10 811 0.713 1.6 3.7 1.9
 Pará 7.0 3.8 36 375 1.9 5 219 0.723 3.3 3.7 3.4
 Rondônia 1.5 0.8 10 573 0.5 6 893 0.735 1.6 3.7 1.9
 Roraima 0.4 0.2 2 088 0.1 5 340 0.746 1.6 3.7 1.9
 Amapá 0.6 0.3 3 839 0.2 6 462 0.753 1.6 3.7 1.9
 Tocantins 1.3 0.7 5 217 0.3 3 998 0.710 1.6 3.7 1.9
 Northeast 51.0 27.7 267 195 13.8 5 238 0.676 29.4 33.3 30.0
 Maranhão 6.1 3.3 17 411 0.9 2 853 0.636 3.5 3.7 3.5
 Piauí 3.0 1.6 9 120 0.5 3 044 0.656 1.9 3.7 2.2
 Ceará 8.1 4.4 35 392 1.8 4 369 0.700 4.3 3.7 4.2
 Rio Grande do Norte 3.0 1.6 17 053 0.9 5 679 0.705 1.6 3.7 1.9
 Paraíba 3.6 2.0 17 072 0.9 4 749 0.661 2.3 3.7 2.5
 Pernambuco 8.4 4.6 52 619 2.7 6 254 0.705 4.9 3.7 4.7
 Alagoas 3.0 1.6 12 857 0.7 4 264 0.649 1.8 3.7 2.0
 Sergipe 2.0 1.1 14 573 0.8 7 409 0.682 1.6 3.7 1.9
 Bahia 13.8 7.5 91 099 4.7 6 594 0.688 7.6 3.7 7.1
 Centre-west 13.0 7.1 144 647 7.5 11 110 0.737 8.0 14.8 8.9
 Federal District 2.3 1.3 47 006 2.4 20 148 0.844 1.6 3.7 1.9
 Goiás 5.6 3.1 45 863 2.4 8 162 0.776 3.3 3.7 3.4
 Mato Grosso 2.8 1.5 28 158 1.5 10 046 0.773 1.6 3.7 1.9
 Mato Grosso do Sul 2.3 1.2 23 619 1.2 10 433 0.778 1.6 3.7 1.9
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of data from the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE) (population and GDP); 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Human Development Index for 2000); and Congress (number of parliamentarians).
a State GDP at current prices, estimated on the basis of 2003 shares.
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Indicators of tax decentralization in Brazil, 
measured by indices of the share of subnational 
governments in total income and expenditure, in 
addition to their autonomy in collecting taxes and 
preparing their budgets, places the country in a similar 
position to the most developed federations; among 
developing countries it is definitely the furthest ahead 
in terms of autonomy.15
It is worth noting that Shah (1994) developed an 
index subnational government autonomy that measures 
the proportion of expenditure financed with internal 
resources or with funding received from third parties, 
but without earmarking. In a group of 10 countries, 
including both rich and poor, Brazil displays the highest 
index, surpassing even those of the United States, 
Germany and Canada.
3. Horizontal decentralization
Alongside vertical decentralization in the distribution 
of public funds, a far-reaching process of horizontal 
deconcentration of revenue has been instigated.
The concentration of federal tax revenue in the 
more developed regions is matched by a scheme for 
distributing federal taxes in which the subnational 
governments of less developed regions receive 
proportionally more (see the updated position as at 
2005 in table 4). This does not take account of the 
larger share of direct social spending on basic social 
measures obtained by those regions.
The regional deconcentration of tax revenue is 
well illustrated by the case of São Paulo. This is the 
most populous and developed unit of the federation; 
it holds 22% of the country’s population and produces 
31% of national output, thereby generating a per capita 
income that is 45% higher above the national average 
(table 5). The State of São Paulo collected about 
37% of all tax revenue in Brazil in 2005; its smallest 
share was state taxes (31%), which reflects the partial 
adoption of the destination principle in the incidence 
of ICMS in inter-state transactions; its largest shares 
(38% and 44%) correspond to federal and municipal 
taxes, respectively.
As a result, the tax burden in São Paulo represented 
42% of state GDP, compared to a national average 
burden of 36.7%. This difference also shows through 
in the measurement of per capita tax revenue, since the 
average collected in São Paulo was about R$ 6,500, 
compared to the national average of R$ 3,900 (see 
again table 2).
Shifting the analysis away from direct tax revenue 
and on to effectively available income —i.e. once 
the constitutionally mandated redistribution of taxes 
between governments has been calculated— shows that 
São Paulo had 26.5% of the disposable revenue of all 
state and municipal governments across the country 
in 2005 (table 4) —nearly 5 percentage points less 
than that state’s share in the generation of national 
GDP. This difference precisely illustrates the degree 
of regional deconcentration promoted by the Brazilian 
tax system.16
The relative importance of state and municipal 
income, measured as a proportion of the income 
of each state, also reveals the progress of regional 
deconcentration. In 2005, the available income of 
subnational governments in São Paulo was just 10% of 
the state’s GDP, whereas the average in the three least 
developed regions was equivalent to 18% of regional 
output (table 4).
The same analysis can be extrapolated from the 
isolated case of São Paulo to the distribution between 
geographic macro-regions, in which the comparison 
between the division of the population and the economy 
on the one hand, and tax revenues on the other, further 
highlights the decentralizing nature of the system 
(figure 4).17
Subnational governments in the three least 
developed macroregions account for 38% of all 
disposable tax revenue (own revenue, plus or minus 
mandated tax transfers) in those spheres of government, 
i.e. 12 percentage points more than their 26% share in 
national GDP. In the southeast region, these percentages 
are 46% and 55%, respectively.
To visualise decentralization more clearly, it is 
possible to compare the actually disposable revenue 
of the governments of each federated unit with their 
respective GDP (see the regions in figure 5 and the 
breakdown by state in table 4 above). The national 
15 The index of the share of subnational governments in direct tax 
collection is unprecedented among like-sized economies. It is similar 
to the indicators displayed by the world’s most developed federations 
such as Canada, Australia, Germany and the United States; and it 
exceeds those of unitary states with administrative decentralization 
strategies such as France and England.
16 This difference will shrink somewhat once the direct revenue 
collected from other state taxes and municipal taxes has been 
calculated, the amount of which in São Paulo should exceed that of 
the rest of the country.
17 See breakdown in table 2, table 4, and further on in table 5.
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index in 2005 was 12%; in the two most developed 
regions, the share was equivalent to just 10 percentage 
points of GDP, whereas in the centre-west it rises 
to about 13%, and in the northeast and north, 20%. 
Dispersion between states is even more pronounced and 
exceeds 30% of GDP in some states in the northeast and 
north. The extreme case of Roraima has a tax income 
equivalent to 55% of local GDP (see again table 4).
The pronounced regional redistribution of 
disposable tax income reflects federal revenue 
transfers to the states and municipalities. In 2005, for 
example, almost R$ 740 per person was transferred 
to governments in the north region, whereas those in 
the southeast received just R$ 195 per person (figure 
6). In the latter region, and in the south, for every real 
collected through IR or IPI, 14 cents were returned 
through revenue sharing funds (FPM and FPE).18
In the specific case of São Paulo, for every real 
of revenue earned from IR and IPI, just six cents flow 
back to the state through the FPM and FPE. In absolute 
terms, São Paulo collected R$ 53.2 billion from IR and 
R$ 12.3 billion from IPI in 2005, and received back 
R$ 3.6 billion from the FPM and just R$ 255 million 
from the FPE in that year.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning the trend of 
disposable tax revenues in subnational governments 
during the post-National Constituent Assembly period. 
The available data confirm the more favourable trend in 
the less developed regions. Considering only revenue 
from the main taxes and federal transfers (on the same 
basis as presented in table 4 above) it is possible to 
compare real growth rates in the period 1988-2005: 
the disposable resources of subnational governments 
increased by 4.3% per year, with the south growing 
more or less at the national rate. Regions with 
disposable resources that outpaced this annual rate 
were the northeast where growth was 5%, the centre-
west (6%) in the north (7.6%); in contrast, growth 
in the southeast was just 3.3%. The wealthiest of the 
country’s 27 states (São Paulo) recorded the smallest 
growth of just 2.7% per year, while, at the other end of 
the spectrum, Maranhão and Piauí saw their resources 
increase by roughly 6% per year.
FIGURE 4
Brazil: Regional distribution of population, gross domestic product 
and subnational tax revenue, 2005a
Source: Prepared by the authors, using data on population and GDP at basic prices from the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute 
(IBGE); and tax revenue data from the Treasury, Federal Internal Revenue Department (SRF), Ministry of Welfare and Social Assistance and the 
National Economic Policy Council. Data on the population, GDP and direct tax revenue are from 2005, while other data relate to 2004.
a Tax revenues: aggregates of the states and municipalities in each region.
b Direct revenue includes taxes within own jurisdiction.
c Disposable income also includes tax transfers granted by Central government.
d  SRF = Data from the Federal Internal Revenue Department.
18 In the State Revenue Sharing Fund (FPE), the south-southeast share 
was limited to 15%, under the law (approved in 1989) that adopted a 
fixed prorating scheme instead of a formula weighted by the inverse 
of income per capita. The updating of this parameter threatened to 
reduce the relative weight of the least developed regions which, by 
growing proportionally more in the 1970s and 1980s, had closed the 
gap between them and the higher-income regions.
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FIGURE 5
Brazil: Subnational disposable tax revenuea by region, 2005
(As a percentage of gross domestic product)
FIGURE 6
Brazil: Transfers of federal taxes per capita to the regions,a 2005
(In real)
Source: Prepared by the authors using data from the Treasury, National Economic Policy Council (tax revenue) and the Brazilian Geographical 
and Statistical Institute (IBGE) (GDP at basic prices).
a Disposable tax revenue includes the revenue raised directly by the states in each region plus the respective transfers of federal and state 
taxes.
Source: Prepared by the authors, using data from the Treasury and the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE).
a Includes constitutionally mandated revenue transfers from central government to the states and municipalities in each region.
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4. Government powers
Although the chapter of the Federal Constitution that 
deals with the tax system and the complementary laws 
that regulate it is very precise and highly detailed in 
terms of the jurisdictions and the distribution of tax 
revenues at each of the three levels of government, the 
chapter on governmental powers is much vaguer and 
fails to establish a clear distribution of tasks between 
the different spheres.
Measures overlap in certain areas (such as the 
environment) and are lacking elsewhere (e.g. security). 
Central government has not managed to satisfactorily 
fulf il its coordination function, and subnational 
governments adopt autonomous policies. Although, 
on the one hand, central government and even certain 
states are curtailing their participation in investments 
and ongoing programmes, they are not transferring staff 
or assets to state or local units. Among other effects, 
this generates an unforeseen increase in aggregate 
public expenditure.
Another constitutional factor that served to make 
fiscal relations more rigid within the federation were 
provisions that imposed the unified labour regime 
for civil servants in the three spheres of government, 
together with the guarantee of early and comprehensive 
retirement pensions in the public sector, and the 
granting of statutory status to all civil servants covered 
by private-sector labour laws (Consolidated Labour 
Laws). The latter responded to the proposal and 
effort made at the time by Centrão, a grouping that 
encompassed some of the more conservative members 
of parliament during the Constituent Assembly of 1987-
1988. The proposal naturally attracted support from 
left-wing parties (linked to civil servant unions).
In any event, the structure of federal government 
financing and expenditure continued to redistribute 
resources between regions —as revealed by comparing 
the regional distribution of the sources and uses made 
of federal government resources, especially those 
earmarked for basic social measures. A pronounced 
regional redistribution of resources can also be seen 
in the direct execution of federal expenditure: suffice 
it to compare data on the regional composition of the 
collection of social contributions and those of the 
main social programmes funded from those sources. 
For example, the southeastern region collected roughly 
two thirds of all contributions, but receives significantly 
smaller percentages of total central government 
expenditure on certain basic social measures: 21% of 
rural pension payments and 34% of ongoing benefits 
both from social assistance and primary health care 
programmes. In the northeastern region which collects 
just 6% of social contributions nationwide, the share 
in the aforementioned programmes amounts to 37% 
in the case of pensions, 47% in social assistance, and 
36% in health.
The same pattern occurs in social security overall 
(the private-sector workers regime), in which the income 
derived from payroll levies is concentrated in the most 
developed states, while the distribution of pension 
benefits is regionally much more disperse.19 In 2004, 
the northeast absorbed 8.3% and 20.2% of revenue and 
expenditure, respectively, while the equivalent figures 
for the state of São Paulo were 43.2% and 30.7%. In 
the overall calculation, the highly redistributive role 
of the current social security regime is revealed by 
the average benefit paid as a proportion of per capita 
GDP. While this is currently equivalent to about 49% 
in the southeast, it soars to 80% in the northeast. In 
some states, the average benefit even exceeds their 
respective per capita income: 132% and 122% in the 
states of Maranhão and Piauí, respectively.
5. Redistribution in parliamentary 
representation
In the political domain, the Brazilian federative system 
also promotes considerable redistribution of power in 
terms of parliamentary representation.
The Federal Senate, based on the United States 
model, consists of equal representation of three senators 
per state. A group of states that account for 43% of 
the Brazilian population (in the north, northeast and 
centre-west) holds 74% of the seats (table 5). The 
Brazilian Senate reviews and votes on all legal bills and 
constitutional amendments passed by the Chamber of 
Deputies, and has power of veto. It also has a number 
of exclusive powers, such as approving ambassadors 
and the heads of several government organizations, and 
setting borrowing limits for states and municipalities 
(and exceptions therefrom). The Senate, which is 
considered the upper chamber, only has less power 
than the lower chamber in one respect: government 
bills enter Congress through the Chamber of Deputies, 
which then has the final word when the Senate returns 
19 The main sources of these data are Anuario Estadístico de la 
Previsión Social and Boletín Estadístico de la Previsión Social, 
both published by the Ministry of Welfare and Social Assistance 
(MPAS).
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them with amendments. Representation in the Chamber 
of Deputies is also not proportional to the population of 
the states, since the maximum number of deputies per 
state is capped at 70 and the minimum is eight. Over-
representation is concentrated in sparsely populated 
states in the north, while underrepresentation occurs in 
the southeast. In the extreme cases, to elect a deputy in 
the most populous state requires 16 times more votes 
than in the country’s least populous state.
has always acted (without exception) as lender of last 
resort, thereby encouraging subnational governments 
to behave more permissively in the fiscal domain. The 
roots of this phenomenon date back to the tradition of 
the centralized State, and reflect cultural and political 
factors such as the party system and congressional 
representation.
Attempts to improve the federative system in the 
1990s led the federal government to adopt a series of 
conciliatory measures, without ever losing sight of 
the historical recommendation made by Tocqueville 
(1957, p.156): “The federal system was created with the 
intention of combining the different advantages which 
result from the magnitude and the littleness of nations.” 
Those measures included changes in arrangements 
for renegotiating subnational debts, reform of the 
state-level ICMS (under the “Kandir Law”) and the 
passing of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, among others. 
All of these initiatives were ways of dealing with the 
most urgent federative problems, within a gradual and 
prudent strategy for action, albeit one that is costly in 
financial terms.
With regard to the renegotiation of subnational 
debts, the expired and unpaid external debt dating back 
to the 1980s, together with domestic bank debt and 
debt in bonds, were all consolidated and taken over by 
the National Treasury in a succession of refinancing 
programmes. The last round of debt ref inancing 
ended in 1999; the central government took over the 
debt of the states, which amounted to R$ 132 billion 
(Law 9.496/97),21 and, on the eve of the publication 
According to Stepan (1997), these representational 
imbalances are a key component of democracy-
constraining federal systems, of which Brazil is the 
most notable case. Although they date back to the 
founding of the Republic, the imbalances became more 
pronounced in the post-World War II period and even 
more so following the creation of six new states and 




To contextualise the analysis more clearly, it needs to 
be borne in mind that in Brazil, as in all federations, 
the subnational spheres of government have less of an 
obligation to concern themselves with macroeconomic 
variables relating to price stability, the fiscal deficit, 
external trade or the balance of payments.20 The major 
challenge that the Brazilian Federation faced following 
the Real Plan was how to reconcile greater or lesser 
fiscal decentralization with rational economic policy 
goals at the national level.
Following the Real Plan, the newly won stability 
and the need to project a positive image of the Brazilian 
economy abroad meant that economic policy focused on 
controlling the public deficit, and hence on federative 
relations. Until the mid-1990s, there was major concern 
about the role of the states and municipalities in the 
lack of control over the fiscal deficit, given their 
large weight in the public sector, asymmetry in the 
distribution of rights and duties between the three 
spheres of government, the existence of state banks 
that financed the deficits, and the possibility of issuing 
debt bonds for the same purpose. Another contributory 
factor was the direct political influence exerted on the 
National Congress by governors and mayors, in an 
electoral and party system such as the one that prevails 
in Brazil. Despite having exclusive constitutional power 
to control public borrowing, in practice the Senate has 
seldom acted to restrain this area.
Moreover, unlike what happens in federations such 
as the United States, the Brazilian central government 
20 For a discussion on fiscal decentralization, price stability and 
macroeconomic policy, including the Brazilian case, see Afonso 
(1996) and Dillinger and Webb (1999); and for an international 
perspective see Spahn (1999).
21 For further details on state debt refinancing agreements, see 
Mora (2002).
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of the Fiscal Responsibility Act in May 2000, it took 
over the debts of 180 municipalities, totalling R$ 
16.4 billion real (Provisional Measure 1.811/99). As 
counterpart, the states and municipalities assumed 
debts with the Treasury that would be financed over a 
minimum 30-year period, with interest ranging from 
6% to 9% per year, and monthly instalments capped 
at 13% of net income. Fulfilment was guaranteed by 
a constitutional amendment allowing the Treasury to 
withhold and offset any due and unpaid amounts from 
the constitutional transfers to which debtor subnational 
governments would be entitled, and to withdraw funds 
directly from the bank account that centralizes the 
financial transactions of the government in question. 
In exchange:
(i) the federal government intervened in, liquidated, 
or sold most state banks to the private sector 
—as from 1994, all large states privatised, 
liquidated, or placed their banks under central 
bank administration;22
(ii) the issuance of new debt in state or municipal 
bonds was suspended, under restrictions contained 
in refinancing contracts; and
(iii) a wide-ranging process of State downsizing 
occurred at the subnational government level, 
particularly in the transport and electric power 
areas. From 1996 to 2003, stakes in 55 State 
enterprises were either privatised or sold, generating 
a total of US$ 34.7 billion (of which US$ 27.9 
billion corresponded to the sale and US$ 6.8 billion 
represented transferred debt).23
The design and approval of the Fiscal Responsibility 
Act was only possible following a refinancing and 
fiscal adjustment process in the main subnational 
governments.24 One of the most far-reaching changes 
produced by this legislation was to prevent new lending 
between governments or the refinancing of past debts, 
thereby breaking with a secular tradition of the Brazilian 
Federation. Only the final reckoning with the past could 
justify and permit the adoption of a new radical law that 
restricted all forms of borrowing between governments 
(even Treasury guarantees on external operations 
henceforth required real guarantees).
Implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
has been a gradual process, particularly in terms of 
correcting possible breaches of the limits. In the case 
of payroll expenditure, a period of over two years was 
allowed to reduce these to the permitted ceiling, and in 
the case of the consolidated debt, the limit for which is 
set by the Federal Senate, a 15-year period was envisaged 
for governments that had refinanced their debts with the 
Treasury to bring them in line. Moreover, following the 
practice adopted since the start of negotiations for debt 
refinancing, the federal government made credit lines 
available to support state and municipal investments in 
the modernization of revenue administration and also 
in fiscal management.
Another front in the process of institutional 
change in the federation involved the decentralization 
of responsibilities and powers.
In the education sector, for example, a systematic 
channelling of resources through FUNDEF was approved.25 
This was a temporary constitutional measure, passed in 
1996 and enforced up to 2006. Its main purpose was 
to universalise the coverage of basic education,26 and 
induce municipalities to take over an ever larger share 
of the public school network; and the inter-governmental 
revenue sharing system was amended for this purpose 
(in proportion to the number of students enrolled). The 
resources came to be earmarked to FUNDEF, based 
on the traditional allocation of taxes to education. A 
stimulus for setting up the fund was provided by central 
22 From 1997 to 2005, when the last state bank was privatized, 12 
state banks were sold, including the two largest – Banco do Estado 
de São Paulo (Banespa) and Banco do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 
(Banerj) —in an operation that generated a total of US$ 6.8 billion. 
The state banks of Piauí and Santa Catarina are still under central 
bank administration.
23 Between 1991 and 2003, the total value of privatizations in the 
federal government domain amounted to US$ 70.8 billion, of which 
US$ 59.5 billion corresponded to direct proceeds and US$11.3 billion 
to transferred debts (for further information see BNDES, 2004).
24 The Fiscal Responsibility Act introduced a number of innovations 
in public governance, such as the obligation to keep expenditure 
and income in balance, and to include an annex of fiscal targets; in 
addition to the requirement to provide an emergency reserve in the 
budget law. Public-sector spending was also capped, the refinancing 
of state debts was disallowed, and it was decided that operations to 
anticipate budgetary income would be paid in the year in which 
they occurred.
25 Under Constitutional Amendment No. 14, a fund was created in each 
state for a 10-year period, which would receive 15% of the amount 
of transfers from revenue sharing funds and the respective ICMS 
collection. In 2005, FUNDEF resources amounted to R$ 32.7 billion. 
Unlike the criteria normally used in tax legislation for distributing 
these resources between the state and its set of municipalities, and 
in the municipal domain between the different municipalities, the 
prorating of each state fund is proportional to the number of students 
enrolled in the respective basic education network, with a view 
to promoting better distribution of spending capacity. In practice, 
governments that collected a lot but spent little on each student had 
part of their incomes redistributed to other governments.
26 In Brazil, basic education is what is provided to children from 
seven to 14 years of age.
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government, which transferred around R$ 500 million 
per year in supplementary funding for states that spend 
less on basic education per student than the national 
minimum.27
In the health sector, the federal government firstly 
attempted to stimulate a strengthening of primary 
care programmes (e.g. those relating to nutritional 
deficiencies and basic pharmacy), leaving execution 
in the hands of state, and particularly municipal, 
authorities. A fund was set up to f inance basic 
municipal measures, which made direct transfers under 
per-capita criteria through the Minimum Basic Care 
(PAB) programme. Subsidies were also given for the 
formation of family health teams, and full management 
of resources including their allocation, from primary 
through to tertiary care, was given to municipalities that 
have undergone training in public health. Transfers in 
basic health care programmes cost about R$ 6 billion 
in 2005, of which the PAB alone received R$ 2.3 
billion.28 Secondly, the most important institutional 
change required a constitutional reform (Amendment 
No. 29, of September 2000), with a view to requiring 
central, state and municipal governments to spend a 
minimum amount of tax revenue on the Unified Health 
System (SUS). Unlike what happens in the education 
sector, where the funding allocation is constitutionally 
mandated, in this case the issue was relegated to a 
complementary law. Until this legislation is published 
(which has not yet happened), the temporary regulation 
of the constitutional amendment requires the central 
government to adjust its expenditure on the SUS each 
year according to the nominal variation in GDP; and 
states and municipalities are required to invest at least 
12% and 15%, respectively, of their tax revenue in the 
system.
The third issue concerns the approach to taxation, 
which in Brazil is closely linked to the federative 
issue. It is an age-old tradition in the country for the 
Constitution to establish exclusive tax jurisdictions 
for each sphere of government and provide highly 
detailed regulations on the subject. This defines the 
“federative pact”, with little concern for the effect 
on the magnitude and distribution of expenditure that 
results from the predefined financing pattern.
The first significant reform project proposed by the 
federal government in 1995 explicitly rejected the idea 
of recentralizing revenues. The basic aim was to unify 
national value-added tax legislation, halt the “tax war”, 
and create a federal tax identical to its state counterpart 
(with the same base, generating factor and legislation); 
and also to unify current social security contributions 
on the basis of value-added rather than total sales, 
again to avoid undermining the competitiveness of 
the economy. In the perspective of a value-added tax 
(VAT) model, with collection shared between the federal 
and state governments, the simultaneous application 
of two rates was envisaged, which would make it 
possible to implement the destination principle in 
inter-state transactions. This would avoid the evasion 
arising if the rate on merchandise destined for other 
states were merely eliminated; and it would also put 
an end to the bitter tax war between Brazilian states.29 
Nonetheless, the urgent need to generate a f iscal 
adjustment to address the grave external crisis caused 
the federal government to retreat in its reform initiative 
in Congress.
In 2003, the new federal government submitted 
a reform bill that essentially pursued the same long-
term objectives. Once again, the changes failed to 
pass, because the economic authorities targeted their 
efforts on short-term measures, such as extending the 
Provisional Financial Transactions Tax (CPMF) and the 
de-linking of federal revenues.
Nonetheless, there have been significant changes in 
infra-constitutional legislation since the implementation 
of the real. Following major alterations such as the end 
of monetary correction in company balance sheets and 
the creation of a simplified federal taxation system 
for microenterprises and small businesses, the federal 
government supported changes to the state-level ICMS 
promoted by the “Kandir Law” and, subsequently, 
in social levies on sales (for the Social Integration 
Programme (PIS) and the Contribution to the Financing 
of the Social Security System (COFINS)).
27 In addition, the states that suffer the largest losses from 
“municipalization” of the earmarked revenues promoted by FUNDEF 
were compensated with exceptional loans granted by the National 
Treasury.
28 The impact of this measure was even greater in the municipal 
sector. With a guaranteed transfer of the minimum (PAB-fixed) of 
R$ 10 per person per year for all Brazilian municipalities, many 
began to receive between two and nine times more from the federal 
government than they had previously been receiving under the normal 
system of the Unified Health System (SUS), which corresponded to 
the invoice value of services provided.
29 This idea is in line with the ideals of the “dual VAT”, defended by 
Bird and Gendron (1997). The detailed system of the shared ICMS 
project, a subject of debate in Brazil and Argentina (also known 
as the “Little boat model” because of its treatment of interstate 
transactions), appears in Varsano (2000), and has been commented 
on and defended by McLure (1999) and Bird (2000).
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From the federative standpoint, the measure with 
the most direct impact was Complementary Law No. 87 
of September 1996, the “Kandir Law”, which abolished 
direct application of state ICMS to all exports, including 
primary and semi-manufactured products. State-level 
taxation of foreign sales was a centuries-old tradition 
in the country, dating back to inherited authorities, or 
capitanias; and the states only agreed to renounce their 
power to tax exports in exchange for financial support 
from the federal government. This was agreed upon at 
the time as a temporary system (lasting up to 12 years) 
in the form of a “revenue insurance” (i.e. funds would 
be transferred only to states that had suffered a loss 
of revenue, and in an amount that was proportional to 
the loss). This subsequently became a compensatory 
federal transfer (of about R$ 4 billion per year), with 
pre-established prorating.
The “Kandir Law” ended up generating permanent 
points of friction that soured federative relations and 
undermined the competitiveness of the economy. Year 
after year the negotiation on transfers was left pending, 
since its approval in the federal budget requires clear 
principles for defining the overall amount of the 
transfers and also appropriate criteria for distributing 
the resources among the states that most needed 
them.30 Secondly, the fact that the exemption was 
not automatic (without transfer to third parties or 
restitution in kind) meant that, depending on the state 
authorities in question, exports could accumulate large 
credit balances in respect of the state ICMS, which was 
contrary to the spirit of the law and also unconstitutional 
(since a partial reform in 2003 had incorporated into 
the Constitution the concept previously set out in the 
Kandir Law). Furthermore, the idea spread among 
state governments that exporting was harmful, because 
it failed to generate revenues yet involved expenses. 
Some state governors not only delayed or rejected the 
reimbursement of credits, but sometimes also resisted 
giving incentives and infrastructure support to new 
projects that mainly targeted the external market.
In the tax domain, it should also be noted that 
the federative arrangement of 1988 was amended as a 
result of a continuous drive by all federal governments 
in the period since the National Constituent Assembly, 
aimed at raising social security contributions and 
other levies that did not involve sharing income with 
states and municipalities. This was due to the fact 
that the amount collected by the taxes was overstated 
in the constitutionally mandated distribution. Central 
government sought to exploit the same tax bases 
through levies that are not subject to revenue sharing, 
and which are also subject to fewer restrictions on the 
power to establish taxes (such as the annuality principle, 
which does not affect social security contributions).
The fact that roughly half of all revenue obtained 
from the two main federal taxes (IR and IPI) is 
transferred to other levels of government, led the central 
government to impose a social levy on enterprise 
profits (at a lower rate, but on a broader base than that 
of income tax levied on the same taxpayers). It also 
maintained and continuously and significantly increased 
taxes on sales and other revenues, which, prior to the 
National Constituent Assembly, were applied through 
the federal Social Investment Fund (FINSOCIAL). 
Subsequently, a tax on financial transactions, which had 
been in force in 1994 only, was reimplemented as the 
Provisional Financial Transactions Tax (CPMF). As these 
social levies are cumulative, they are generally harmful 
to the competitiveness of the economy. The recent 
attempt (in 2002-2003) to alleviate the accumulation 
of contributions to PIS and COFINS ended up adding 
to the tax burden because the new rate was incorrectly 
calibrated, either through the change in regime or 
through the expansion of the base for taxing imports 
without reducing taxation in the local market.
The historical trend of the structure of the 
Brazilian tax burden shows, firstly, a drastic reduction 
in the burden imposed by the only federal VAT-type 
tax: the Industrial Products Tax (IPI). Whereas in 1970, 
this tax raised an amount equivalent to 4.4% of GDP, 
in 1980 and 1990 the percentage had dropped to half; 
10 years later (in 2000) it was no more than 1.6% 
of GDP, and in 2005 it was 1.2%, one of its lowest 
ever levels. In contrast, social contributions levied 
on income in general and sales (such as PIS or the 
Civil Servant Assistance Plan (PASEP), created in the 
early 1970s, and also COFINS, established in the early 
1980s as the Social Investment Fund (FINSOCIAL)) 
grew vigorously following the 1988 reform. In 1980, 
revenue from PIS amounted to just 1% of GDP; in 1990, 
the two contributions (PIS and COFINS) collected 2.7% 
of GDP; in 2000, the joint burden was 4.4% of GDP, 
and in 2005 it attained the record level of 5.6% (of 
which 4.4 percentage points corresponded to COFINS). 
Including the 1.5% of GDP obtained from CPMF and 
the 1.3 percentage points raised with the levy on net 
30 Originally, an annex to the Kandir Law contained a detailed and 
innovative transfer scheme, known as “revenue insurance”, which 
ultimately was eliminated at the request of the states.
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profits (CSLL),31 the tax burden generated by the four 
contributions (PIS, COFINS, CSLL and CPMF) amounted 
to 8.4% of GDP in 2005. That was equivalent to over 
six times the revenue obtained from the federal IPI and 
exceeds that earned from state ICMS, or the federal IR.
The remarkable transformation described above, 
suggests that the process of gradual change and 
reasonable flexibility in federative relations has 
been abandoned, intentionally or otherwise. Public, 
macroeconomic and social policies clearly display 
fiscal recentralization —among other things to absorb 
the growing pressure of huge expenses generated by 
income transfers, which range from social benefits 
through to interest on the public debt.
The reality of recentralization also shows through 
in the control over state and municipal public borrowing. 
Despite the achievement of growing primary surpluses, 
the reduction and virtual elimination of subnational 
bank borrowing and, more importantly, the payment of 
all overdue monthly instalments, at April 2006 the net 
debt of states and municipalities and their respective 
debts with the central government amounted altogether 
to the equivalent of 19.1% of GDP, according to central-
bank figures. Of that total, over 95% represented 
refinancing contracts with the Treasury.
The maintenance of such a high debt stock – not 
to say growing in recent years, depending on the year 
that is taken as a base for the evaluation – stems from 
a problem that was not foreseen when the refinancing 
programmes were designed. The exchange-rate regime 
in force immediately after the adoption of the real 
was fixed, or semi-fixed, and there was no hesitation 
in adopting the general price index (IGP-DI) as an 
indicator of the refinancing. Nonetheless, when the 
floating exchange-rate regime was established, the 
IGP fluctuated greatly and accumulated a much larger 
variation than the official index adopted in the inflation 
targeting regime —the extended national consumer price 
index (IPCA)— between 2000 and 2004. From that year 
onwards, the problem diminished with a new cycle of 
real overvaluation, but its reappearance seems inevitable 
when the exchange rate returns to its habitual levels.
In any event, the equilibrium in the refinancing 
contract has been lost, in particular because, in addition 
to over-indexation, the balances are also subject to 
real interest rates that annually have surpassed the 
economy’s average real growth rate at least threefold. 
Consequently, although between 2001 and 2005, state 
and municipal governments paid the National Treasury 
a cumulative amount of R$ 70.1 billion solely in 
respect of the three main refinancing operations (Laws 
9.496/97 and 8.727/93 and Temporary Measure 2.185), 
at 31 December 2005 they owed the absurd sum of 
R$ 336.8 billion —R$ 137.5 billion more than five 
years earlier.
As the monthly service on the outstanding state 
and municipal debt is calculated by the maximum 
set in proportion to current income (most of the 
time), the imbalance in the debt valuation mechanism 
produces an artificial capital and accounting effect, 
rather than an immediate f inancial impact. This 
compromises the transparency and governance of fiscal 
and macroeconomic policy in a way that tends to go 
unnoticed by those who are unaware of the details 
and subtleties of the settlement of the net debt and 
primary and nominal results. The fact that it alters 
stocks without affecting flows explains why it does 
not elicit more vehement protests from the state and 
municipal authorities. The federal economic authorities 
take advantage of the “over-correction” of credits to 
the states and municipalities, to disguise a more rapid 
expansion of federal debt, particularly in the form 
of bonds —in this case, without artificial effects, 
because it stems from the application of absurdly 
high real interest rates, particularly in comparison to 
international parameters.
A good illustration of this is the recent trend of 
fiscal outturns – given that the most important concept 
is the nominal deficit, since increasing the federal 
primary surplus while federal interest payments were 
growing even faster served little purpose. Between 
2000-2002 and 2003-2005, the central government 
primary surplus grew from 2% to 2.8% of GDP, while 
nominal interest expenditure rose from 3.7% to 5.9%. 
Thus, the nominal deficit of that sphere of government 
almost doubled from 1.7% to 3.1% of GDP between 
the two three-year periods.32 Nonetheless, taking the 
31 Social Contribution on Net Profits (CSLL).
32 In other words, having been responsible for just 44% of the 
nominal deficit of the public sector between 2000 and 2002, central 
government has generated 84% of the deficit over the last three 
years. This is basically due to the federal share of expenditure on 
public debt interest, which rose from 49% to 71%. The interest 
rate variable is fundamental in explaining this trend. These central 
government expenses fell by 1.9 percentage points of GDP between 
2000 and 2002, while growing by 3.56 percentage points of GDP 
between 2002 and 2005. In short, the role of central government has 
changed. Between 2000 and 2002 it bore the main burden of reducing 
the nominal deficit as a proportion of GDP (while the nominal deficit 
of subnational governments increased), but in the last three years 
this trend has been reversed.
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public sector as a whole, there is a small reduction 
in the nominal deficit (from 3.9% to 3.7% of GDP 
between the two periods analysed), which is explained 
by a significant improvement in the results of State-
owned enterprises and, especially, state and municipal 
governments (the subnational deficit fell from 3.1% to 
less than 0.3% of GDP between 1999 and 2005, and is 
approaching zero for 2006). In other words, the nominal 
deficit of the central government grew while those of 
subnational governments declined, which reinforces 
the impression that the Fiscal Responsibility Act was 
introduced for the sole purpose of bringing the states 
and municipalities into line.
Federative discoordnation has also been growing 
over the division of responsibilities and jurisdictions. 
In the f ield of public social policies, the federal 
authorities have preferred to expand targeted benefit 
programmes, to the detriment of universal-type 
expenditures such as basic education and healthcare. 
Expenditure on pensions and social assistance is 
growing rapidly. In addition to the effects of the 
increase in the minimum wage, the number of new 
social benefits (granted to pensioners and beneficiaries 
of public social security systems) have far outpaced 
any measure of demographic growth, particularly in 
the cases of sickness subsidies and welfare benefits 
for income maintenance, including the merger in the 
Bolsa-Familia programme of the financial assistance 
granted earlier to families through the Bolsa-Escola, 
Bolsa-Alimentação, Eradication of Child Labour and 
Vale-Gas programmes. This orientation in itself would 
not generate major problems if, initially, there had been 
no demand for a new round of tax increases, especially 
through changes in COFINS. Secondly, the budgetary 
dilemma was aggravated, since maintenance expenses 
increased at growing rates and outstripped the growth in 
incomes, thereby further reducing room for productive 
investments, particularly in infrastructure.
The tendency of the Federal Government to 
provide direct assistance and benefits to the population 
has significant repercussions for federative relations 
—firstly because assistance was previously a typically 
local expense, but is now financed increasingly out of 
the federal budget. Although the municipalities act 
as partners (in registering and monitoring beneficiary 
families), they obviously do not perform this task 
with the same diligence or efficacy as when they 
are spending their own funds. The greatest problem, 
however, has been the lack of priority in universal social 
programmes, where state and municipal governments 
have a decisive role to play in expenditure execution, 
particularly in the education and health sectors. Federal 
contributions to such programmes have not increased, 
and in some cases have shrunk (health). There are 
also serious risks in the very short term: FUNDEF will 
expire at the end of 2006, and Congress has not yet 
approved the budget for setting up another fund, the 
Basic Education Development Fund (FUNDEB). This 
new fund promises to increase the federal transfers 
since the Constitution establishes the nominal amount 
of the transfers without indicating where the resources 
will come from —i.e. retracing the path of conflict 
of interests that dogged the “Kandir Law”. In the 
health sector, the federal authorities have attempted 
to get around the mandatory spending defined by a 
constitutional amendment in 2000, by including in 
the accounts expenditures that are not in the health 
category, such as benefits paid by the Bolsa-Familia 
programme. At the same time, states and municipalities 
have increasingly been required to finance expenses in 
that area out of their own resources.
In the tax domain as such, the basic symptom 
of federative discoordination has already been noted: 
recent tax measures have maximized the option of 
increasing unshared contributions and benefits have 
been concentrated in taxes that are shared with the 
states and municipalities.
Between 2002 and 2005, the overall tax burden 
rose by 2.3 percentage points of GDP. The state-level 
ICMS accounted for 12% of that increase, and the 
weight of COFINS/PIS tripled this. Although the increase 
in tax revenue alleviated the budgetary effects, the 
federative division of disposable income (after taking 
constitutionally mandated transfers into account) shows 
a sharp increase in the federal share, which over the 
last five years has grown by 1.8 percentage points from 
55.8% to 57.6% of total national tax revenue. Taking 
1991 as the base (the year of the smallest federal share 
since the National Constituent Assembly), the total 
federal share increased by 2.9 percentage points and 
the municipal share by 1.5 percentage points, while 
the states’ proportion shrank by 4.4 percentage points 
(see table 1 and figure 1 above).
From a longer-term perspective, after four 
decades the municipalities now hold the position that 
the states previously occupied as the dynamic hub 
of Brazilian federalism, to judge by the trend of the 
federative distribution of disposable tax revenue. The 
state government share has declined by 10 percentage 
points —in 1965, before the reform promoted by the 
military governments, the states received 35% of the 
overall tax revenue; four decades later, this figure had 
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fallen to roughly 25%. Over that lengthy period, the 
municipal government’s share of total revenue increased 
from 10% to 17%.
As was to be expected, state governors detected the 
problem but chose to support solutions that ultimately 
proved ineffective. In the constitutional amendment 
promulgated in late 2003, subnational governments 
obtained the transfer of one quarter of the amount 
collected through the Contribution for Intervention 
in the Economic Domain (CIDE), although earmarked 
for investments in transport, given that the federal 
government had created this tax and was using it on a 
large scale. The revenue from this levy then dropped 
to one of the lowest levels of all federal taxes (possibly 
part of its incidence was shifted to COFINS, which is 
held entirely in the National Treasury). With regard to 
the project that is still underway from the same reform, 
of programmes of structural measures implemented 
in partnership with local governments (e.g. health 
care), while promoting direct measures (such as 
popular pharmacy and hospital care). Because of these 
structural distortions and emerging fiscal problems, 
conflicts within the federation have increased.
Nonetheless, any recentralization of power in 
federal government hands, which would inaugurate 
a new cyclical phase in the historical course of the 
Brazilian Federation, is not supported by the federal 
government agenda. Such a process would be unviable 
from the political standpoint and also undesirable in 
terms of administrative efficiency and social welfare 
in a such a large, heterogeneous and populous country. 
Similar reasoning, with greater emphasis on the political 
conditions, would also prevent attempts to change the 
regional distribution of federal public resources of tax 
origin from being included in that agenda.
Where little or no progress has been made is 
in diminishing the “tax war” between the states, 
by manipulating the respective ICMS and granting 
benefits (particularly the return of the portion of the 
tax corresponding to other states) under the guise of 
subsidised loans and even shareholdings. The main 
effect of this manipulation was and is to effectively 
reduce disposable state income, as a whole, and increase 
the supporters of municpalism chose to lobby for a 
one-percentage-point increase in IR and IPI destined 
for the Municipal Revenue Sharing Fund, payable in 
the last month of the year. Nonetheless, the bill has not 
yet been voted on and is being blocked by the federal 
government. When the latter published the temporary 
measure in 2005 to exempt investments, most of the 
incentives were provided to Income Tax on Legal 
Entities (IRPJ), which is not shared. Disagreements 
have also resulted in a delay and even cuts in transfers 
under the “Kandir Law”, as noted above.
In short, the main objective of the framers of the 
1988 Constitution, of promoting fiscal decentralization, 
ultimately produced an unmistakeable trend towards 
municipalization and, most recently, a recovery in the 
relative importance of the federal government, while 
the states have been the major losers.
V
Towards a new federative agenda
The Brazilian fiscal federation is a faithful projection 
of the general framework of the country’s economy, 
society and political system. It firstly displays high 
indices of subnational government participation in the 
direct generation and spending of tax revenues; in the 
execution of payroll, goods and services expenditure; 
and the administration of budgets with minimal 
interference from central government. Yet there is no 
planned and organised fiscal decentralization process 
to reconcile the redistribution of revenues and division 
of burdens. This serves to accentuate the complexity of 
federative relations, while conspiring against economic 
eff iciency and undermining the quality of public 
services. Moreover, the difference in the tax burden 
between the more and less developed states of the 
federation is enormous.
The Brazilian Federation wil have to face an 
extensive agenda of issues over the next few years. 
While longstanding “structural” problems remain 
unresolved, new challenges have arisen in recent years, 
including gradual recentralization. This has been most 
evident in the exercise of tax jurisdictions, where federal 
transfers are progressively being eroded (undermining 
the bases of revenue sharing funds and reducing 
transfers under the “Kandir Law”). The process has 
also affected expenditure execution, demoting a number 
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fiscal pressures from state governments on the central 
government —without considering the fact that the 
unregulated dispute over ICMS was certainly a decisive 
factor in reversing the historical trend towards regional 
deconcentration of the economy. The recent case of 
automobile assembly plants is emblematic: once the 
widespread granting of incentives was declared, the 
most developed states ended up exploiting the obvious 
advantages, such as their position in the market and 
better economic and social infrastructure.33
The consequences of the war over ICMS extend 
beyond the fiscal domain, because they are closely 
related to the course of industrial policies and external 
trade.34 These in turn are essential for a robust revival 
of economic growth. It should be noted here that the 
economic and financial openness of the Brazilian 
economy in the 1990s, following at least six decades 
of inward-looking economic growth (protectionism 
and vigorous state intervention) have actually made 
federative relations more complicated. In a more open 
economy, there is less solidarity and greater divergence 
of interests and views on trade and industrial policy 
between the more and less developed regions.35
Another important area where there has been 
no initiative at all concerns the politics of federative 
relations. Both the previous and current governments 
have abstained from proposing either reform proposals 
for the electoral and party system —to make it easier 
to build majorities and make parliamentarians less 
dependent on state governors— or proposals to 
correct the imbalances in state representation in the 
Chamber of Deputies. This omission resulted from a 
fear of disturbing the functioning of the government 
majority in Congress at a time of successive votes on 
constitutional amendments relating to the economy. 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that those reforms will 
have to be included in the national agenda sooner or 
later.
As a final observation, until now, unlike what 
happens in other countries, the Brazilian Federation, 
while still a work in progress, has been showing signs 
of reasonable stability. This has been assisted by the 
legacy of the unitary state and the moderation of ethnic, 
linguistic and religious differences among the Brazilian 
people. Cycles of contraction and expansion in central 
power and the conciliatory tradition of Brazilian 
politics have also eased the necessary adjustments 
through time. Specifically, in the case of the tax and 
fiscal systems, redistributive mechanisms are used to 
reconcile divergent and contradictory regional interests 
by transferring public resources between the different 
spheres of government and between more and less 
developed regions, with an intensity and rapidity 
that few federations have matched without dramatic 
political and civil upheavals. It is no coincidence 
that the ideals of fiscal federalism are always evoked 
to defend localised interests and public policies of 
regional impact.
Despite this framework, the flexibility of Brazilian 
federalism will face demanding tests in the near 
future, given the challenges of development policy and 
political reform. It is therefore essential to anticipate 
events to consolidate Brazil in a strong, united and 
democratic federation.
33 A symptom of the slowdown in the historical and natural trend 
towards economic deconcentration is provided by a comparison 
between real GDP growth rates in the period following establishment 
of the real (in which the tax war intensified). Between 1994 and 
2005, national GDP grew by a cumulative 29.7%, while the GDP 
of the state of São Paulo expanded by 31.5% (according to data 
from IBGE and the Data Analysis System Foundation of the State 
of Sao Paulo (SEADE), respectively). The economy of São Paulo 
far outpaced the national economy in the upswing phases (such as 
2004 and 2005), and this more than compensated for the inverse 
situation of falling faster than the national rate in the downswing 
of short business cycles.
34 There has also been vigorous lobbying by parliamentarians and 
governors from less developed regions in favour of expanding federal 
incentives to bring them closer to the standards of the free zone 
existing in Amazônia. Unlike others in the world, this free zone 
operates basically with imports and sales on the domestic market.
35 For a detailed analysis of the prospects and problems of 
federalism in Brazil from a regional perspective, see Affonso and 
Silva (1995).
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